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RECENT DECISIONS
was defective when it first reached defendant's hands and that defen-
dant failed to discover the defect; or, (2) defendant's handling of the
bottle caused the defect and that defendant permitted it to go un-
noticed. But direct evidence of the above facts is generally unobtain-
able because of the vast number of bottles generally handled by a
person in defendant's position 6 and because such facts if they did
exist would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant or
his agents. Therefore, the rule is that direct evidence need not be
introduced; 7 the plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. 8
Plaintiff attempted to prove negligence by showing that defen-
dant's method of inspection, although it was the one customarily used
in the industry, was not the best and that there were other tests that
would have exposed a thermal shock fracture in the bottle. If all
of plaintiff's evidence is accepted as true, the instant case is correctly
decided since the applicable rule of law under this given set of facts
is that defendant merely perform the ordinary tests used by the rest
of the industry.9 Defendant is not bound to use a better method
simply because one exists.10
The dissent argued that the defendant's negligence is a question
of fact for the jury to decide, on the ground that the customary way
of doing things may be the negligent way 11 and that the industry
should not be protected from liability by a custom which it has de-
veloped for its own exemption.12
While the majority opinion is logically in accord with stare
decisis, it is submitted that the dissent is sociologically sound in that
it demands that more than a minimum protection be afforded the
public.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LAST CLEAR CHANcE. - Plaintiff's in-
testate, a ten year old boy, accompanied by his twelve year old
brother, hitched a ride on defendant's truck. The boys crouched on
a step fastened to the right front fender, out of the driver's sight,
and held onto a perpendicular rod attached to the body of the truck
6 Licari v. Markotos, 110 Misc. 334, 180 N. Y. Supp. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
7 Saglimbeni v. West End Brewing Co., 274 App. Div. 201, 80 N. Y. S.
2d 635 (3d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N. Y. 875, 84 N. E. 2d 638 (1949).
s Ibid.
9 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932) ; Curley
v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Luciano v.
Morgan, 267 App. Div. 785, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 502 (2d Dep't 1943).
10 Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N. Y. 290, 190 N. E. 643 (1934).
11 Shannahan v. Empire Eng. Corp., 204 N. Y. 543, 98 N. E. 9 (1912);
Bennett v. Long Island R. R., 163 N. Y. 1, 57 N. E. 79 (1900).
12 Ibid.
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just back of the cab. As the truck turned onto a bumpy unpaved
road decedent was bounced from his perch, but clung to the handhold
with his feet dragging in the roadway for a distance of three hundred
feet. Finally he lost his grip and fell under the rear wheel, thereby
sustaining fatal injuries. After the fall the driver continued on for
about another two hundred feet. Decedent's brother testified that
when decedent slipped, he, the brother, began banging on the cab
window and screaming "Stop." The defendant's driver testified that
he saw a little hand banging on the window and "so I figure some-
thing is in danger, must be, to be there . . . I stopped immediately
right then." The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the complaint. Held, reversed and a new trial granted.
It was for the jury to determine whether the defendant's driver had
in fact become actually aware of the danger, and whether he then
ignored the warning in an unreasonable manner when he still had a
last clear chance to avoid the accident." Chadwick v. City of New
York, 301 N. Y. 176, 93 N. E. 2d 625 (1950).
The doctrine of last clear chance subjects the strict rule of con-
tributory negligence to the qualification that the negligence of the
plaintiff will not bar his recovery for injuries sustained if it be shown
that the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence,
might have avoided the accident.1 The reason for the rule lies in
causation; the subsequent failure of the defendant to use due care
becoming the sole proximate cause of the injury.2 In New York
and other minority jurisdictions, the application of this doctrine is
restricted to situations wherein the knowledge of the peril has been
brought home as an actual fact to the defendant, and he has then
failed to exercise due care to prevent the injury while there was still
a clear chance to so do.3 Thus the three essential factors which must
be found by the jury in order to apply the doctrine are (1) actual
knowledge of the peril, (2) subsequent failure to use due care, and
(3) injury proximately caused by this subsequent failure.4
1 Grand Truck Ry. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 429 (1892).2 See Storr v. New York Central R. R., 261 N. Y. 348, 351, 185 N. E.
407, 408 (1933) ; see Note, 171 A. L. R. 365 (1947).
3 Elliott v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. 2d
86 (1944) ; Hulsey v. Illinois Cent. R. R_, 242 Ala. 136, 5 So. 2d 403 (1942) ;
Gates v. Boston & Maine R. R., 93 N. H. 179, 37 A. 2d 474 (1944); Rew v.
Dom, 160 Ore. 368, 85 P. 2d 1031 (1938); "The doctrine of the last clear
chance, however, is never wakened into action unless and until there is brought
home to the defendant to be charged with liability a knowledge that another
is in a state of present peril, in which event there must be reasonable effort to
counteract the peril and avert its consequences .... Knowledge may be estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence, in the face even of professions of ignorance
... but knowledge there must be, or negligence so reckless as to betoken in-
difference to knowledge." Woloszynowski v. N. Y. Central R. R., 254 N. Y.
206, 208, 172 N. E. 471, 472 (1930).
4 Elliott v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. 2d
86 (1944).
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The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defen-
dant had actual knowledge of the situation,5 and that the defendant's
subsequent negligence was the cause of the injury.6 This knowledge,
although it must be actual, may be established by circumstantial
evidence 7 even in the face of professed ignorance. In establishing
causation it must be found that defendant had a last clear chance, and
not merely a last possible chance,8 and that defendant had sufficient
time and present ability to prevent the injury.9 Defendant need not
risk injury to self or others,10 nor must he use the best possible
means since he is required only to act reasonably, not infallibly. 1
The doctrine is not applicable when it is found that defendant has
done all in his power to prevent the injury; 12 likewise, it is not ap-
plicable when the negligent act of the plaintiff continues up until the
time of the injury so that the negligence of the plaintiff coincides
with that of the defendant and both combined operate as the efficient
cause of the injury.13
In the instant case the defendant made the novel contention that
even though the rapping on the window may have given rise to the
inference that the decedent's brother was in peril, it would not war-
rant an inference that the decedent, unseen by the defendant's driver,
was also in danger. The court in rejecting this contention held that
the doctrine of last clear chance may not be limited categorically to
situations wherein the defendant has precise knowledge of both the
exact nature of the danger and of the particular individual threatened
so long as there is proof that defendant actually knew that someone
was in danger. The standard of conduct required is that of the
ordinary reasonable man,'14 and if the jury finds actual knowledge of
peril sufficient to move a reasonable man to exercise due care, the
defendant is then bound to use such care to avoid injury.15 The
determination of the court in respect to this contention of the defen-
dant is one of first impression and may well prove a landmark in the
application of the last clear chance doctrine in New York.
5 Panarese v. The Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933).6 Ibid.
7 Woloszynowski v. N. Y. Central R. R., 254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471
(1930); cf. Bragg v. Central New England Ry., 228 N. Y. 54, 126 N. E. 253
(1920).
s Shultes v. Halpin, 205 P. 2d 1201 (Wash. 1949).
0 Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S. W. 2d 784 (1941).
20 Ibid.
12 Chesapeake and 0. Ry. v. Switzer, 275 Ky. 834, 122 S. W. 2d 967 (1938);
Woloszynowski v. N. Y. Central R. R., 254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471 (1930).
12Wright v. Union Ry., 224 App. Div. 55, 229 N. Y. Supp 162 (lst Dep't
1928), aff'd, 250 N. Y. 526, 166 N. E. 310 (1929).
23 Panarese v. The Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933) ; Wright
v. Union Ry., supra note 12.
14 Ibid.
25 Elliott v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. 2d
86 (1944) ; Panarese v. The Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933).
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It is submitted that in the instant case the testimony of plain-
tiff's witness and decedent's driver as to the warning given, together
with the evidence pertaining to the driver's reaction to this warning,
created issues of fact for the jury.
TORTS - RIGHT OF AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR CHILD TO SUE
PARENT IN TORT.-An unemancipated minor child was killed when
a truck driven by his father plunged from a dangerous mountain
road into a river. The father, who was intoxicated, forced his son
to accompany him in the truck. The child's administrator brought
an action for wrongful death:' against the father's administrator.
Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. An unemancipated minor child
may maintain an action for damages against his parent for a "willful"
tort. Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P. 2d 445 (Ore. 1950).
In most jurisdictions it is an established rule that an uneman-
cipated minor child may not maintain an action in tort against his
parent.2 Some of these courts, however, have cautiously limited
their holdings to negligent torts.3
This immunity doctrine and its rationale was first clearly laid
down in Hewlett v. George 4 which was an action for false imprison-
ment, the court holding: "But, so long as the parent is under obliga-
tion to care for, guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal
obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can
be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families composing
society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of
1ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. § 8-903 (1940): "When the death of a person
is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representa-
tive of the former .. .for the benefit of the estate of the deceased may main-
tain an action at law therefor against the latter, if the former might have
maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter, for an injury done by the
same act or omission . ..."2 Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S. W. 2d 468 (1938), 24 VA. L. REv.
928; Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929) ; Smith v. Smith,
81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703,
9 So. 885 (1891); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N. J. Misc. Rep. 68, 129 AUt. 431(1925) ; Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923), 23 Cor- L.
RFv. 686, 8 MINN. L. REv. 71; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 Atl.
198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927); see Notes,
31 A. L. R. 1157 (1924), 71 A. L. R. 1071 (1931), 122 A. L. R. 1352 (1939) ;
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv.
1030 (1930).3 See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708, 711 (1932) ; Luster
v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E. 2d 438, 440 (1938), 7 FORD. L. Rv. 459,
86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 909; Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d 236,
238 (1942).
468 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
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